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Abstract
Research on resource-bounded agents has established that rational agents need to be able to revise
their commitments in light of new opportunities. In the context of collaborative activities, rational
agents must be able to reconcile their intentions to do team-related actions with other, conflicting
intentions. The SPIRE experimental system allows the process of intention reconciliation in team
contexts to be simulated and studied. Initial work with SPIRE examined the impact of environmental
factors and agent utility functions on individual and group outcomes in the context of one set of
social norms governing collaboration. This paper extends those results by further studying the effect
of environmental factors and the agents’ level of social consciousness and by comparing the impact of
two different types of social norms on agent behavior and outcomes. The results show that the choice
of social norms influences the accuracy of the agents’ responses to varying environmental factors,
as well as the effectiveness of social consciousness and other aspects of agents’ utility functions.
In experiments using heterogeneous groups of agents, both sets of norms were susceptible to the
free-rider effect. However, the gains of the less responsible agents were minimal, suggesting that
agent designers would have little incentive to design agents that deviate from the standard level of
responsibility to the group.
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1. Introduction
A number of applications have been proposed that require agents to work collaboratively
to satisfy a shared goal [11,17,37,41, inter alia]. In the context of such collaborative
activities, agents need to be able to revise their commitments and plans as new
opportunities arise, handling situations in which intentions to do team-related actions
conflict with other possible actions or plans. This paper focuses on the process of decision-
making that agents perform when reconciling conflicting intentions in these group-activity
contexts, and it examines the use of both external social norms (e.g., imposing penalties
when agents fail to honor their team commitments) and internal measures of social
consciousness (e.g., an agent’s own sense of its reputation as a responsible collaborator) to
influence the agents’ decisions.
The problem of intention reconciliation arises because rational agents cannot adopt
conflicting intentions [7,15, inter alia]. If an agent has adopted an intention to do some
action β and is given the opportunity to do another action γ that would in some way
preclude its being able to do β , then the agent must decide between doing β and doing γ .
It must reconcile intentions, deciding whether to maintain its intention to do β or to
replace that intention with an intention to do γ . This paper examines instances of intention
reconciliation in which at least one of the conflicting intentions is related to an agent’s
commitment to a team plan. While much of the prior work on agent collaboration and
negotiation [25,27,31] has assumed that commitments to collaborative activity are binding,
we are interested in situations in which agents are allowed to renege occasionally on such
commitments. For example, in the domain of automated systems administration (see [39]),
it might be reasonable to allow an agent committed to performing a file-system backup
to break that commitment (to default) so that it can assist with crash recovery on another
system.
Intention reconciliation in team contexts requires that agents weigh the purely individual
costs and benefits of their decisions with team-related concerns. Defaulting on a team-
related commitment for the sake of another opportunity may at times appear beneficial
from a short-term, selfish perspective, even with the imposition of immediate penalties for
defaulting. However, because we assume that agents have relationships that persist over
time, an agent must also consider the impact of defaulting on its ability to collaborate in
the future and, more generally, on its future expected outcomes.
In a given society of agents, social-commitment policies [39]—domain-independent
social norms that govern various aspects of collaboration—may be used to influence an
agent’s decision-making. These policies include both rewards and penalties for individual
acts in the context of group activities, and the details of a team’s policy are made known to
its members so they can adjust their decision-making accordingly. By stipulating ways in
which current decisions affect future as well as current utility, social-commitment policies
change the way agents evaluate trade-offs. They provide a mechanism for constraining
individuals so that the good of the team plays a role in the agents’ decision-making.
Social-commitment policies may include immediate penalties for defaulting like the ones
proposed by Sandholm et al. [1,32–34], as well as longer-term policies in which an agent’s
utility is affected by its behavior over time. Section 3 describes two examples of the latter
type of policy.
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Social factors may also function in another way. If agents get part of their utility
from the team, they have a stake in maximizing group utility [9]. Therefore, when
facing a choice, it may be useful for an agent to consider not only this single
choice, but also the larger context of similar choices by itself and others. While being
a “good guy” (refusing offers that would improve the agent’s immediate individual
income) may appear suboptimal by itself, everyone’s being a good guy when faced
with similar choices may lead to better outcomes for the whole team. Therefore, it may
be beneficial for agents to include this type of social consciousness in their decision-
making, considering this internal factor as well as externally imposed social-commitment
policies when deciding whether to default. We have used the brownie-points model
of Glass and Grosz [13] to study the effect of social consciousness on outcomes, as
well as its susceptibility to manipulation. Our experiments show that including social
consciousness in agents’ decision-making can lead to improved outcomes when agents
face a high degree of uncertainty about the values of their future outside offers and task
assignments.
To enable the simulation and study of intention reconciliation by collaborative agents,
we have developed the SPIRE experimental framework. In earlier works [13,39,40], we
used SPIRE to study the effects of a single social-commitment policy, as well as various
environmental factors and agent characteristics, on the decisions and outcomes of both
homogeneous and heterogeneous groups of agents. In this paper, we extend that work
by further examining the effect of environmental factors and the agents’ level of social
consciousness and by studying the outcomes of simulations using two different social-
commitment policies.
Our work with SPIRE brings two threads of research together, joining research
on collaboration in multi-agent systems [15,16,24,27,42]—which has established that
commitment to the joint activity is a defining characteristic of collaboration—with
research on rationality and resource-bounded reasoning [8,12,21,30, inter alia]—which
has established the need for agents to dynamically adapt their individual plans to
accommodate new opportunities and changes in the environment. Our work addresses
the need for collaborative agents to manage plans and intentions in multi-agent contexts,
reasoning jointly about commitments to individual plans and commitments to group
activities. In addition, SPIRE allows us to consider repeated agent interactions that
change over time in non-trivial ways; these long-term interactions are more realistic
than both the repeated games typically considered in game-theory research and the
one-shot deals that have been the focus of most prior work on team formation and
intention reconciliation. The contributions of this paper include two examples of social-
commitment policies that could be employed by agent societies and a comparison of
the effectiveness of these policies in a variety of contexts. In addition, we examine the
interaction of these external policies with an internal measure of social consciousness.
Based on the experimental results, we suggest principles for designers of agents and
agent environments. In particular, the experiments suggest that designers of agents for
environments employing either of our social-commitment policies would have little
incentive to develop agents that deviate from a standard level of responsibility to the
group.
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2. The SPIRE framework
The SPIRE (SharedPlans Intention Reconciliation Experiments) simulation system was
designed to enable the study of intention reconciliation in collaborative contexts. SPIRE
allows us to examine the impact of environmental factors, social-commitment policies, and
different agent utility functions on individual and group outcomes. The many variables
involved and the often unexpected ways in which they interact make a system like SPIRE
useful for testing hypotheses, uncovering relationships, and gaining insight into the issues
involved in the intention-reconciliation problem. Below, we present an overview of the
system; more details can be found in an earlier paper [39].
SPIRE models situations in which a team of agents works together on group activities,
each of which consists of doing a set of tasks. We currently make the simplifying
assumptions that each task lasts one time unit and can be performed by an individual agent.
Agents receive income for the tasks that they do; this income can be used to determine an
agent’s current and future expected utility.
A SPIRE simulation run is divided into a series of weeks, each of which is in turn
divided into some number of time slots. The tasks in the group activity each take one time
slot to complete. Each week, the same group activity is assigned to the same team of agents,
because varying either the group activity or the team members could obscure sources of
variation in the outcomes. However, the individual tasks within the group activity are not
necessarily done by the same agents each week. Because negotiation over which agents
should perform which tasks is not the focus of our work, we simulate this process with a
central scheduler. At the start of each week, this scheduler assigns tasks from the group
activity to agents according to a fixed policy. (See Sections 3.1 and 3.2 for more details.)
To model the type of conflicts we are interested in studying, agents are chosen at random
each week and given the chance to do one of a series of outside offers that conflict with
tasks from the group activity. (In the experiments reported in this paper, the offers are tasks
that involve a single agent in isolation; in the future, we plan to explore conflicts that arise
when agents are committed to multiple group activities.) To accept an offer, an agent must
default on one of its assigned tasks. The values of the outside offers are chosen randomly
from a distribution that gives agents an incentive to default.
If an agent chooses an outside offer, it defaults on its assigned task β . If one of the
other agents in the group is capable of doing β and is available at the time slot for which
it is scheduled, the task is given to that agent, whom we will refer to in this context
as a replacement agent; otherwise, β goes undone. If the replacement agent honors its
commitment to do β , it receives the value of β as part of its income for that week; no
additional rewards are obtained for serving as a replacement. The team as a whole incurs
a cost whenever an agent defaults; these group costs are divided equally among the team’s
members, and the magnitude of the costs is larger when no replacement agent is available.
Group costs model the real-world losses that result from searching for a replacement and,
if none can be found, from the group’s failure to complete its group task.
The framework described above addresses scenarios similar to ones considered in
the economics and game-theory literatures (e.g., [20,22,28]). For example, honoring or
defaulting on group commitments is comparable to cooperating or defecting in the classic
prisoner’s-dilemma game [2–4]. However, many of the assumptions made in prior work
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are not valid in the environments that SPIRE is designed to consider. For example, in the
repeated prisoner’s dilemma [5,26,29,35], agents face the same scenario at each decision
point, whereas SPIRE agents generally play a different game on each iteration. Moreover,
the games differ in nontrivial ways; in particular, an agent’s utilities and task assignments
can depend on both its own past actions and the actions of other agents (see Section 4).
SPIRE agents also have imperfect information about the actions, utility functions, and
outside-offer values of other agents, and they typically face multiple decisions in a single
time period, before any new information is received.
Goldman and Kraus [14] have developed formal models of the type of scenario that
SPIRE is designed to address for situations from an e-commerce domain involving two
sellers and three buyers. The complexity stemming from the above-mentioned features of
the SPIRE game made it difficult to analyze scenarios involving a larger number of agents.
In particular, the fact that agents’ actions affect their future utilities means the individual
games are not independent, a fact that introduces serious complications into the analysis.
In addition, SPIRE models situations that may involve heterogeneous groups of agents;
such heterogeneity makes it difficult to collapse a group of agents into a single agent for
the purpose of simplifying the analysis. Another possible theoretical approach involves
applying classic decision-theoretic frameworks like Markov decision processes to SPIRE
scenarios. However, while researchers have begun to adapt these frameworks to multi-
agent systems, a number of important research challenges need to be addressed before
these frameworks will be able to handle problem domains with collaborating but self-
interested agents [6]. It is also worth noting that while Sandholm et al. [1,32–34] apply a
formal approach to scenarios involving two or three agents in their related work on leveled
commitment contracts (see Section 7), they too employ simulations when considering
larger groups of agents like the ones we have studied with SPIRE.
A SPIRE simulation requires that a number of parameters be set, some of which are
central to the decision-making problem being studied, such as those involved in the social-
commitment policies and the agent utility functions. Varying these parameters allows
insights about the problem of intention reconciliation to emerge. Other parameters, such
as the number of time slots and the number of task types, should be chosen based on the
particular application domain being modeled. For instance, we have modeled a group of
agents engaged in computer-systems administration; see our earlier work [39] for more
detail. Still other parameters, such as the values of the tasks and outside offers, are less
central, and the values chosen for them are in some sense arbitrary. Provided that certain
relationships are maintained (e.g., that the outside offers are worth more on average than
the group activity tasks), the particular choices do not seem to significantly affect the nature
of the results (see, e.g., subsequent work by Das et al. [10], which modified the distributions
of the task and offer values).
3. Social-commitment policies in SPIRE
The experiments reported in this paper compare two social-commitment policies that
encourage agents to consider the good of the group when reconciling intentions. In one
policy, agents are ranked on the basis of their past behavior, and agents who are higher
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in the rankings receive more valuable tasks. In the other policy, each agent’s income is
discounted by a factor that primarily reflects its own past behavior, regardless of what
other agents have done. The following sections describe each of these policies in turn.
3.1. Ranking-based social-commitment policy (RSCP)
In the ranking-based social-commitment policy (RSCP), agents are ranked on the basis
of their past behavior, and the scheduler assigns a portion of each week’s tasks on the basis
of these rankings. More specifically, each agent has a score1 that reflects the number of
times it has defaulted. Each default in the current week results in an absolute decrement in
the agent’s score. The impact of past weeks’ defaults diminishes over time. In addition, the
score reduction that a defaulting agent incurs is larger if no agent is available to replace it.
At the end of each week, an agent’s score is updated as follows:
s(w+ 1)= αs(w)− ρ1d − ρ2D (1)
where w is the week number, s(0)= 0, α is a constant decay factor that reduces the impact
of past defaults, d represents the number of defaults with replacement in the current week,
D represents the number of defaults without replacement in the current week, and ρ1 and
ρ2 are constant score reductions for defaulting with and without replacement respectively.
This formula results in scores that are rational values less than or equal to zero. For the
experiments in this paper, we used α = 0.5 to represent a moderate level of decay, and we
chose ρ1 = 1 and ρ2 = 5 to reflect the fact that defaulting without a replacement is much
more costly to the group. These values can be modified to create other versions of this
social-commitment policy.
The scheduler assigns N tasks per agent on the basis of the agents’ scores; we refer
to these tasks as score-assigned tasks. The agent with the highest score receives the N
highest-valued tasks that it can perform (given its capabilities and availability), the agent
with the second-highest score receives the next N tasks, and so on. If there is more than
one agent with the same score, the scheduler randomly orders the agents in question and
cycles through them, giving them tasks one at a time. After each agent in the group receives
N tasks, the remaining tasks are assigned to agents picked at random. The strength of the
RSCP can be varied by modifying the value of N .
This policy was used in our prior work involving SPIRE [13,39,40]. It reflects
the intuitive notion that teams of agents would be more likely to entrust their most
valuable group-related tasks to collaborators who had been most responsible in their past
interactions with the group. One difficulty of this policy is that an agent’s future income is
based on its ranking, which in turn depends on the behavior of other agents. As a result,
obtaining an accurate estimate of future income requires a game-theoretic analysis, and
such analyses are known to be difficult in situations involving large numbers of agents.
Section 4.2 outlines the approach to income estimation that we have adopted in light of
these difficulties.
1 In some of our prior work [13,39], we refer to this score as the agent’s rank. Using score avoids confusion
with the agent’s ranking, which is its position relative to the other agents when they are ordered according to their
scores.
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3.2. Discount-based social-commitment policy (DSCP)
In the discount-based social-commitment policy (DSCP), the income that an agent
receives from a portion of its tasks is discounted using a factor that depends on the agent’s
individual reputation as a collaborator and the reputation of the group as a whole, but not
on the individual reputations of other agents. Because an agent’s income does not depend
on its ranking, this social-commitment policy allows agents to estimate their future income
more accurately than the RSCP. In addition, discounting allows irresponsible agents to be
punished in cases when they are the only ones capable of performing a valuable task; under
the RSCP, such agents would receive the full value of the task, regardless of their position
in the rankings.
The reputation of an agent is represented using a numeric score that increases as the
agent’s reputation decreases. In addition, a defaulting agent incurs a larger score increase
if no agent is available to replace it. At the end of each week, an agent’s score is again
updated using Eq. (1), where ρ1 and ρ2 now have negative values. The group as a whole
also has a reputation score that is maintained in a similar way. For the experiments in this
paper, we used α = 0.5 as we did under the RSCP, and we chose ρ1 =−1 and ρ2 =−1.1.
The ratio of ρ2 to ρ1 cannot be as large here as it is under the RSCP, because an agent’s
score leads directly to the magnitude of its task discounts. As a result, larger values of ρ2
would drastically skew the income that agents receive.
In the DSCP, the scheduler assigns all tasks randomly, but N tasks per agent are selected
at random and discounted by a factor that depends on both the agent’s individual reputation
score and the reputation score of the group. The actual discount factor is computed by
scaling these scores to be in the range [0,1] and taking their product. The individual scaling
function (ISF) is the following sigmoid function:
ISF(x)= 1.04
1+ e(x−5)/1.5 (2)
where x is the individual’s score; it is shown in the left half of Fig. 1. The parameters of the
function were chosen to accommodate typical individual-score values, which range from 0
to 10. Using a sigmoid function allows agents with good reputations to default a moderate
Fig. 1. The individual scaling function or ISF (left) and the group scaling function or GSF (right) used in
experiments involving the DSCP.
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number of times without being punished too severely, while still providing a disincentive
against defaulting too often. In addition, agents whose reputations are already very poor do
not suffer much additional harm if they continue to default.
The group scaling function (GSF) is the following linear function:
GSF(x)= 1 − x
41.25n
(3)
where x is the group’s score and n is the number of agents in the group; it is shown
in the right half of Fig. 1. Dividing by the number of agents effectively scales the cost
of defaulting based on the number of opportunities to default, because the number of
outside offers in a SPIRE simulation is directly proportional to the number of agents. The
parameter values were chosen to give GSF values that are typically between 0.8 and 1. This
range of values ensures that group reputation matters less than individual reputation when
determining the income from discounted tasks. As a result, agents need not consider the
behavior of individual agents or subgroups of agents when estimating their future income,
and they can thus avoid the type of game-theoretic analysis that is required for accurate
future-income estimates in the RSCP (Section 3.1).
The motivation for discounting task values is economically grounded. If workers fail
to meet their obligations, they will tend to receive lower pay raises or larger pay cuts.
Similarly, if a group (e.g., a company) fails to meet its obligations, it will be less likely to
win bids for new jobs and will be forced to bid lower, resulting in lower group income.
Strictly speaking, the portion of the discount that stems from the group’s reputation is
actually part of the environment, not the social-commitment policy, because it comes from
outside the group. One problem that we have yet to address is what should be done with
the income that agents lose from discounting. In our current implementation, this income
is simply discarded.
4. Decision-making in SPIRE
In deciding whether to default on a task β so as to accept an outside offer γ , an agent
must determine the utility of each option. SPIRE currently provides for up to three factors
to be considered in utility calculations: current income (CI), future expected income (FEI),
and brownie points (BP). We review each of these factors below.
4.1. Current and future expected income
Current income considers only the income from the task or outside offer in question,
as well as the agent’s share of the group cost should it default. Future expected income
represents the agent’s estimate of its income in future weeks, based on the social-
commitment policy and the agent’s score. The agent first approximates the impact that
defaulting will have on one week of its income. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 describe this estimate
in more detail. The agent then extrapolates beyond that week to obtain a more complete
estimate using a discount factor δ < 1. This use of discounting can be viewed in at least
two different lights: as a reflection of an agent’s internal uncertainty about its predictions
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[39], or as an external factor—much like an interest rate—that allows an agent to assess
the present value of income that will be earned in the future.
For the experiments in this paper, we assume that agents are uncertain about the duration
of their collaboration, and therefore we use the infinite-horizon version of the FEI formula
described by Glass and Grosz [13]. If F is the estimate of next week’s income and δ is the
discount factor, then:
FEI(F )= δF + δ2F + δ3F + · · · =
(
δ
1 − δ
)
F. (4)
We refer to the factor in parentheses as the FEI weight.
4.2. Estimating next week’s income under the RSCP
When operating under the RSCP, an agent estimates its two possible incomes during
the following week by approximating its new position in the rankings both if it defaults
and if it does not default, and determining the value of the score-assigned tasks it would
receive in each case. There are many factors that affect the agent’s actual position in the
rankings, including the behavior of other agents and the offers that the agent receives later
in the same week. To model situations in which agents have only limited information about
each other, we assume that agents do not know the scores of other agents nor the total
number of defaults in a given week, but only their own ranking in both the current and
the previous week. It is difficult for an agent to accurately estimate its ranking using such
limited information. To compute a future ranking, the agent needs to reason not only about
its own behavior, but about the behavior of other agents, and about how its own behavior
will influence the other agents, and so on. To avoid these game-theoretic complications, we
adopted the simple approach described below.
An agent begins its estimation by using its previous and current weeks’ rankings to
approximate the number of agents who defaulted last week. For example, if an agent’s
position in the rankings improved and it did not default last week, it assumes that some
of the agents who were previously above it in the rankings must have defaulted. It carries
this estimate over to the current week, assuming that the same number of agents will again
default. Using this estimate, the agent creates four agent equivalence classes: (1) the agents
currently above it who will not default, (2) the agents above it who will default, (3) the
agents below it who will not default, and (4) the agents below it who will default. The
agent adds itself to the equivalence classes using the following rules:2
(a) To approximate what will happen if it does not default, it adds itself to the second
class.
(b) To approximate what will happen if it defaults when there is an agent available to
replace it, it adds itself to a new class between the second and third classes.
(c) To approximate what will happen if it defaults with no replacement, it adds itself to
the third class.
2 These rules may underestimate the impact of defaulting, because agents can drop even further in the rankings
when they default.
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To estimate next week’s income, we allow agents to call the scheduling function,
because members of a collaborative group are aware of their group’s social-commitment
policy, and thus will know the policy used to assign tasks under the RSCP. An agent calls
this function once to compute the value of its score-assigned tasks if it does not default
(Fno-def, obtained using the classes formed from rule (a)), and a second time to determine
the value of its score-assigned tasks if it does default (Fdef, using the classes from (b)
or (c)).
An agent’s estimate of its one-week income loss from defaulting (Fno-def − Fdef) thus
depends on five factors: its previous ranking, its current ranking, whether it defaulted last
week, whether there is an agent available to replace it, and the number of agents with
which it is collaborating (because this affects the sizes of the equivalence classes). The
estimated loss of income can vary greatly [40]. Agents occasionally estimate an income
loss of 0, which means that factors such as the strength of the social-commitment policy
and the value of the FEI discount factor will not affect their decisions. We experimentally
determined that the average actual income loss in these situations is 20, and thus we
increase Fno-def by 20 in such cases.
In the current system, an agent’s estimation does not consider the number of times that
it has already defaulted in the current week. Although this simplification ignores the fact
that agents should expect to drop more in the rankings the more they default, it saves
considerable computation by allowing agents to reuse their estimations, avoiding repeated,
expensive calls to the scheduler.
4.3. Estimating next week’s income under the DSCP
When operating under the DSCP, an agent estimates its two possible incomes during
the following week by computing its new reputation score both if it defaults and if it does
not default, and determining the expected value of its discounted tasks in each case. We
assume that an agent knows both its individual score and the ISF function, but not the
GSF function or the behavior of other agents. Because an agent could infer its group’s
prior GSF values from the values of its discounted tasks, we provide these prior GSF
values to the agents, who average them to compute an estimate of the current week’s GSF
value. Each individual score is first converted to an ISF value and then multiplied by both
the expected value of the tasks that will be discounted and the estimated GSF values.
Because all tasks are assigned randomly, agents can compute the expected value of the
tasks that will be discounted without the expense of calling the scheduling function. These
lower computation costs allow agents to compute estimated incomes that reflect their prior
defaults during the current week (cf. Section 4.2).
4.4. Social consciousness using brownie points
In addition to being concerned about its income, an agent may also derive utility from
being a “good guy” and considering the good of the group. Glass and Grosz’s brownie-
points model [13] captures this aspect of agents’ utilities, providing a measure of an agent’s
sense of its reputation as a responsible collaborator. Agents begin a simulation run with
an identical, non-zero number of brownie points. When they default, agents lose brownie
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points. In addition, agents gain brownie points when they choose not to default, reflecting
the fact that they are doing what is good for the group. Because an agent’s reputation is
affected not only by whether or not it defaults, but also by the context of the decision, each
change in brownie points takes into account the values of the task and offer involved in
the decision. If an agent defaults on a low-valued task, its brownie points are reduced less
than if it defaults on a high-valued task; if it defaults for the sake of a high-valued offer,
its brownie points are affected less than if it defaults for a low-valued offer. Similarly, the
increase in brownie points when an agent chooses not to default is greater for low-valued
tasks and for high-valued offers.
Note that brownie points represent an agent’s own private evaluation of its reputation as
a responsible collaborator, not the perception of other agents. This factor is not a social-
commitment policy: it does not directly affect the value of the tasks that an agent receives
in the current collaboration. Rather, brownie points allow agents to incorporate a measure
of social consciousness in their decisions. In informal terms, socially conscious agents
may make decisions that are locally, individually suboptimal, because doing so enables the
group as a whole—and perhaps, indirectly, the agent itself—to be better off. Experimenting
with brownie points allows us to investigate the conditions under which such an internal
constraint on defaulting could be advantageous for agent design. While it might be possible
to express this element of an agent’s utility in monetary terms, using the non-monetary
measure described above is simpler and more intuitive. The monetary and non-monetary
elements of an agent’s utility have different units, but the various factors can still be
combined using a technique from multi-attribute decision-making [45] described below.
4.5. Combining the factors
To compare the overall utility of an agent’s options, the CI and FEI values for each
option are combined to give a total estimated income (TEI). Next, the TEI and brownie
point (BP) values are normalized: the default and no-default TEI values (TEIdef and
TEIno-def respectively) are each divided by max(TEIdef, TEIno-def), and the default and no-
default BP values (BPdef and BPno-def) are similarly normalized. This normalization allows
us to compare TEI with BP and to combine each (TEI, BP) pair into a single utility value.
Finally, the normalized values are weighted based on the agent’s social consciousness:
Udef = (1 − BPweight)× normTEIdef + BPweight × normBPdef
Uno-def = (1 − BPweight)× normTEIno-def + BPweight× normBPno-def (5)
where BPweight is between 0 and 1. An agent’s social consciousness can be increased by
increasing the value of the BPweight parameter.
Agents default when Udef > Uno-def. Agents who do not use brownie points (corre-
sponding to a BPweight of 0) may compare their unnormalized, unweighted TEI values.
5. Experimental results
In this section, we present the results of experiments designed to compare the two social-
commitment policies and to further examine the impact of environmental factors and agent
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Fig. 2. SPIRE settings used for most of the experiments in this paper.
characteristics—including social consciousness—on individual and group outcomes. We
have grouped the experiments according to whether they use the RSCP (Section 5.1) or the
DSCP (Section 5.2). In Section 6, we discuss the results in their entirety.
The experiments make the simplifying assumptions that all agents are capable of doing
all tasks and that all agents are initially available at all times. (SPIRE can also handle
the more general situation in which agents have different capabilities and availabilities,
but we have yet to investigate this type of scenario.) Fig. 2 summarizes the settings used
for most of the experiments; departures from these values are noted in each experiment’s
description. Several of the settings, including the number of task types and the number of
time slots, were chosen to model the work week of a systems administration team. Other
settings were chosen based on prior experimentation.
We fixed the number of outside offers for these experiments at 30 percent of the
number of tasks, matching the percentage of tasks affected by the social-commitment
policies. When there are a large number of outside offers, as was the case in our earlier
experiments [13,39,40], the impact of the social-commitment policies on the agents’
incomes is diminished, because agents will frequently be able to offset their lower incomes
from group tasks with income earned from outside offers.
For each social-commitment policy, we first present experiments involving homoge-
neous groups of agents. The initial experiments determine the optimal utility-function pa-
rameters for homogeneous groups. The resulting values for δ—the parameter that agents
use to weight future income (Section 4.1)—and for BPweight—the parameter that deter-
mines an agent’s level of social consciousness (Section 4.5)—are used as the standard
settings in the remaining experiments. Earlier work with SPIRE [13,40] showed that ho-
mogeneous groups of agents do better as individuals when they have an intermediate level
of social consciousness (i.e., when they consider both brownie points and income by using
a BPweight that is greater than 0 and less than 1), and when they do not give too much
weight to future income (i.e., when they avoid δ values close to 1 that prevent most de-
faults). Therefore, we expected to see comparable results for both the RSCP and the DSCP
under the new outside-offer rate.
Other homogeneous-group experiments assess the impact of two environmental factors:
the number of tasks scheduled for each time slot (the task density), and the rate at which
outside offers are made. These experiments test the following hypotheses: (1) as task
density increases, the rate of defaulting will decrease, provided that the percentage of tasks
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affected by the social-commitment policy is held constant; (2) as task density increases,
mean individual income (from tasks and offers) and group income (from tasks only) will
both decrease; (3) as the outside-offer rate increases, the rate of defaulting will stay the
same, and thus the absolute number of defaults will increase; and (4) as the outside-offer
rate increases, group income will decrease, but mean individual income will increase.
The motivations for these hypotheses are discussed in the sections describing the actual
experiments (Sections 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.2.2, and 5.2.3).
In addition to these homogeneous-group experiments, we also present the results
of experiments that assess the robustness of the optimal homogeneous-group utility
parameters by testing them in heterogeneous contexts in which some agents attempt to take
advantage of the group. Initial SPIRE experiments involving heterogeneous groups [40]
showed that the free-rider effect—in which less responsible agents take advantage of
their more responsible collaborators—is a potential problem in such settings. However,
preliminary tests indicated that this effect might be avoided in environments with lower
outside-offer rates. Therefore, we used the heterogeneous-group experiments in this work
to test the hypothesis that agents who use the optimal homogeneous-group parameters for
social consciousness and the weight given to future income will do better than their less
responsible collaborators in environments with a moderate number of outside offers.
All of the experiments also serve to compare the two social-commitment policies. We
hypothesized that agents operating under the DSCP would achieve higher individual and
group outcomes than agents operating under the RSCP because of the better estimates
of future income—and thus the better decisions—that the DSCP makes possible (see
Section 3.2). Similarly, we expected that this ability to make better predictions would lead
DSCP agents to respond better to environmental changes than RSCP agents.
The results presented are averages of 30 runs that used the same parameter settings but
had different, randomly-chosen starting configurations (the values of tasks in the weekly
task schedule, and the number and possible values of the outside offers). Error bars on
the graphs indicate the end points of 95 percent confidence intervals; in many cases, the
intervals are small enough that the errorbars are difficult to see. In each run, the first ten
weeks serve to put the system into a state in which agents have different scores; these
weeks are not included in the statistics SPIRE gathers.
5.1. RSCP experiments
We first present the results of experiments using the ranking-based social-commitment
policy or RSCP (Section 3.1). The incomes that we present are normalized by dividing
each agent’s income by the average total value of the tasks received by an individual
agent. In computing mean individual income and group task income for an entire group,
this approach is approximately equivalent to dividing each agent’s income by the value
of the tasks assigned to the agent itself [39], but it avoids this latter method’s tendency
to artificially inflate the incomes of less responsible subgroups in experiments involving
heterogeneous groups. In addition, because the average total value of the tasks assigned to
an agent does not vary greatly across the task schedules used in a simulation, it adds less
variance to the results than an alternative normalization method that divides by the total
value of the tasks assigned to a particular agent [40].
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Fig. 3. The impact of δ and BPweight on the normalized mean individual income of homogeneous groups of
agents under the RSCP. To make the distinctions between the curves clearer, we have focused on a portion of the
y-axis from [0.9 : 1.2].
5.1.1. Determining the baseline utility-function parameters for the RSCP
In selecting the standard settings for δ—the parameter that agents use to compute
FEI (Section 4.1)—and for BPweight—the parameter that agents use to weight brownie
points (Section 4.5)—we chose values that allow homogeneous groups of agents to receive
optimal mean individual incomes under a 30 percent outside-offer rate. We tested many
different pairs of values for δ and BPweight; Fig. 3 displays the results of some of these
tests.
The tests show that mean individual income is maximized for a δ value of 0.4 and
a BPweight of 0.1. Agents who use lower δ or BPweight values tend to default more
often than is optimal, which results in group costs that more than counterbalance the extra
income from outside offers, while agents who use higher δ or BPweight values do not
default enough to take full advantage of the potential utility gains from outside offers. This
result supports our hypothesis that agents operating in homogeneous groups do better when
they have an intermediate amount of social consciousness and do not weight future income
too heavily. Unless otherwise stated, the settings of δ = 0.4 and BPweight = 0.1 were used
throughout the experiments in this section.
5.1.2. Behavior of the RSCP under different task densities
In this set of experiments using the RSCP, we varied the number of tasks scheduled for
each time slot (task density). This factor can also be expressed as the percentage of agents
who are scheduled to perform a task in each time slot. Earlier [39], we showed that task
density can effect at least two factors that directly influence an agent’s decision-making:
(1) the degree to which other agents are available to replace an agent when it defaults on a
group-related commitment; and (2) the percentage of tasks affected by the RSCP, and thus
the range of possible values for the score-assigned tasks. In these experiments, we eliminate
the second of these factors by maintaining a constant percentage of score-assigned tasks
as we increase the task density. This allows us to test the following hypotheses: (1) agents
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will default less often as task density is increased, provided that the percentage of tasks
affected by the social-commitment policy is held constant; and (2) increasing task density
will lead to lower individual and group incomes. Both of these hypotheses are based on the
fact that increasing task density should lead to a decrease in the availability of replacement
agents (as an agent is scheduled to perform more tasks, it is less available to serve as a
replacement) and thus to an increase in the group costs from defaulting (see Sections 2
and 3.1). Fig. 4 displays the results.
With a fixed percentage of score-assigned tasks, agents default less often as task density
is increased (Fig. 4, left), confirming our first hypothesis. However, this decrease in
defaulting cannot be fully explained by a decrease in the availability of replacement agents,
the rationale used in forming the hypothesis. As Table 1 shows, this factor does not play a
role at the lower densities, for which replacement agents are always available. Instead, the
consistent decrease in defaulting is primarily caused by the influence of the score-assigned
tasks. While maintaining a constant percentage of score-assigned tasks does ensure that the
values of these tasks are drawn from a consistent range of values as task density is varied,
it also causes the number of these tasks to increase as task density increases. As a result,
the FEI losses from defaulting also increase, and agents are less likely to default.
Fig. 4. The impact of task density on the rate of defaulting (left) and on normalized individual and group incomes
(right) when using the RSCP.
Table 1
Effect of task density on the average
percentage of outside offers for which no
replacement agent is available under the
RSCP
Task density Offers with no
replacement
33.3% 0.00%
50.0% 0.00%
66.7% 0.00%
83.3% 5.15%
100.0% 100.00%
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The effect of task density on both mean individual income (from both tasks and outside
offers) and group income (from tasks only) is shown in the graph on the right side of Fig. 4.
As task density increases, agents do worse as individuals, despite the fact that their rates
of defaulting decrease and that the availability of replacement agents at lower densities
means that the group costs of defaulting do not increase for these densities. To understand
this result, it is important to realize that RSCP agents can afford to default at very high rates
when replacement agents are always available. In such cases, the group costs of defaulting
are lower, no task income is lost because defaulted tasks are still completed, and agents
receive added income from serving as replacements. While reducing the rate of defaulting
lowers group costs, it also reduces the amount of extra income from offers, and that loss
ends up being greater than the savings in group costs. When replacements are not always
available, group costs are higher and income is lost from tasks that go undone. As a result,
agents do even worse. The individual-income results thus confirm our hypothesis, but for
reasons that are more complex than we anticipated.
As task density increases from 33.3 to 83.3 percent, group task income (i.e., income
from tasks only, minus any group costs) also increases, disproving our hypothesis. Here
again, the unexpected availability of replacement agents for these task densities means
that group costs do not increase significantly as task density is varied within this range of
values. Therefore, a reduction in defaults leads to lower group costs and higher group task
income. At a task density of 100 percent, replacements are never available, and this leads
to the anticipated increase in group costs, a loss in income from uncompleted tasks, and
lower group task incomes.
5.1.3. Behavior of the RSCP under different outside-offer rates
Our earlier work [40] gave some indication of the effect that the outside-offer rate can
have on outcomes. In an attempt to explore this effect more fully, we conducted a set of
experiments using the RSCP in which we varied the outside-offer rate, considering cases in
which the number of outside offers were 10, 20, 30, 50, and 75 percent of the total number
of tasks.3 We tested two hypotheses: (1) as the number of outside offers increases, the rate
of defaulting will stay the same because the offers will be drawn from the same range of
values, and thus the absolute number of defaults will increase; and (2) as the number of
offers increases, mean individual income (from tasks and offers) will increase because of
additional income from a larger number of accepted offers, but group income (from tasks
only) will decrease as more tasks go undone. The results are shown in Fig. 5.
Both the default-rate and income results for these experiments are heavily influenced
by the availability of replacement agents, a factor whose influence we did not anticipate in
this context. As the outside-offer rate increases, the same rate of defaulting leads to a larger
number of defaults. Thus, the available replacements are used up more frequently, and there
are more cases in which no replacement can be found (Table 2). Agents are more reluctant
to default without a replacement because the resulting group costs and score reductions are
3 In our earlier work [13,39,40], the number of outside offers was chosen randomly using a uniform
distribution from 5/8 to 7/8 of the number of tasks. A 75 percent outside-offer rate is the mean of this distribution.
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Fig. 5. The impact of the outside-offer rate of defaulting (left) and on normalized individual and group incomes
(right) when using the RSCP.
Table 2
Effect of outside-offer rate on the average per-
centage of outside offers for which no replace-
ment agent is available under the RSCP
Outside-offer rate Offers with no
replacement
10% 0.03%
20% 0.91%
30% 5.15%
50% 25.45%
75% 47.81%
larger. Thus, as the offer rate increases, agents default at a lower rate (Fig. 5, left), contrary
to our hypothesis, although the increasing number of offers means that the absolute number
of defaults does still increase.
The income that individual agents receive (Fig. 5, right) is affected by group costs,
which increase as replacements become more scarce and agents accept a larger number
of outside offers, and by the income that agents receive from outside offers, which
also increases as agents accept more of them. For the three lowest offer rates, the offer
income outweighs the group costs, and the mean individual income increases as predicted.
Under offer rates of 50 or 75 percent, however, the large number of offers for which no
replacement is available leads group costs to dominate, and thus the mean individual
income decreases. For group task income, the extra income from offers is not included,
and thus increasing group costs leads, as expected, to lower group incomes over the entire
range of offer rates.
5.1.4. Heterogeneity in social consciousness under the RSCP
We next conducted two sets of experiments in which the environmental conditions
were fixed and the composition of heterogeneous groups of agents was varied. We first
considered scenarios in which some of the agents are socially conscious and some are not.
We varied the percentage of the agents in each subgroup, considering cases in which none,
1/12,4/12,6/12,8/12,11/12, and all of the agents use brownie points with the optimal
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Fig. 6. Outcomes of heterogeneous-group experiments in which some agents use brownie points and some do not
under the RSCP. The rate of defaulting (left) and the normalized individual and group incomes (right) are shown
for each subgroup as the percentage of agents that use brownie points is increased.
homogeneous-group BPweight setting of 0.1 (the BP agents), and the rest of the agents do
not use brownie points (the no-BP agents). We hypothesized that the BP agents would do
better than the no-BP agents, avoiding the free-rider effect seen in our earlier work (see the
introduction to Section 5). Fig. 6 displays the results.
As expected, agents who use brownie points default less often than those who do not
(Fig. 6, left). In addition, as the BP agents become a larger percentage of the group, the
no-BP agents demonstrate small decreases in defaulting while the BP agents maintain
more or less steady rates of defaulting. Increasing the percentage of more responsible,
BP agents has two conflicting effects on the agents’ estimated FEI losses, and thus on their
likelihood to default. On the one hand, because an agent’s estimate of its ranking in the
following week is based on the behavior of the other agents (see Section 4.2), an increased
percentage of more responsible collaborators will tend to lead agents to estimate larger
drops in the rankings from defaulting and larger resulting losses in FEI. On the other hand,
a larger percentage of more responsible collaborators results in an increased availability of
replacement agents and thus to smaller estimated FEI losses. These conflicting forces have
different strengths in the two subgroups, leading one to default less often and the other to
default at a constant rate.
The two subgroups exhibit small but statistically significant differences in normalized
individual income, and even more significant differences in group task income (Fig. 6,
right). The agents who are not socially conscious do worse as individuals in homogeneous
contexts (comparing the individual-income results at the 0 and 100 percent points), but
they do better than the more responsible, socially conscious agents in heterogeneous
groups. These less responsible, no-BP agents take advantage of their more responsible
collaborators, who reduce the overall group costs by defaulting less often. The less
responsible agents are thus able to reap the full benefit of the outside offers that they accept
while shifting a portion of the resulting group costs on the more responsible agents. This
disproves our hypothesis that the free-rider effect would be avoided under a lower outside-
offer rate; see Section 6 for a discussion of why these experiments yield different results
than the preliminary experiments that formed the basis of our hypothesis.
Although the no-BP agents do better as individuals in heterogeneous groups, their
income from group-related tasks alone is much lower than that of the BP agents because
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they default on more tasks. Moreover, the overall group task income—which is effectively
a weighted average of the two subgroup incomes—as well as the individual and group task
incomes of both subgroups, all increase as the number of BP agents increases, showing that
everyone benefits when more agents are socially conscious. Given that the less responsible
agents do only slightly better as individuals than their more responsible collaborators,
these results suggest that agent designers can improve group outcomes without sacrificing
much in the way of individual gains by building agents with an intermediate level of social
consciousness.
5.1.5. Heterogeneity in the weight given to FEI under the RSCP
In this set of experiments using the RSCP, we considered heterogeneous groups of
agents who use different δ values to weight their estimates of F , their income in the
following week (see Eq. (4)). We varied the percentage of agents in each subgroup,
considering cases in which none, 1/12,4/12,6/12,8/12,11/12, and all of the agents
use the optimal homogeneous-group δ value of 0.4 (the higher-delta agents), and the
rest use a lower δ value of 0.3 (the lower-delta agents). Both subgroups also used the
standard BPweight of 0.1. We hypothesized that the higher-delta agents would do better
than the lower-delta agents, avoiding the free-rider effect seen in our earlier work (see the
introduction to Section 5). Fig. 7 displays the results.
As expected, agents who put a higher value on future expected income default less often
than agents who do not value future income as highly (Fig. 7, left). As the size of the more
responsible subgroup increases, members of both subgroups default at fairly constant rates,
for reasons discussed in the previous section. These default-rate results differ markedly
from the results of our earlier mixed-delta experiments [40]. In those experiments, the
more responsible agents almost never defaulted because they used an extremely high δ
value (0.95, for an FEI weight of 19). As a result, the two agent subgroups were segregated
in the rankings, with the less responsible agents always occupying the lowest rankings
and thus having less incentive to behave responsibly. This effect was accentuated as the
more responsible agents became a larger percentage of the group, and thus the lower-delta
agents defaulted more often as the number of higher-delta agents increased. In the current
Fig. 7. Outcomes of heterogeneous-group experiments in which agents use two different values of δ to weight
future income under the RSCP. The rate of defaulting (left) and the normalized individual and group incomes
(right) are shown for each subgroup as the percentage of agents placing a higher value on future income is
increased.
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mixed-delta experiments, the more responsible agents default often enough to prevent a
strict segregation of the two subgroups in the rankings, and the less responsible agents thus
avoid the cycle of increasing defaults that we saw in the earlier experiments.
The impact of changing subgroup sizes on both mean individual income and subgroup
task income is shown in the right half of Fig. 7. Once again, the less responsible agents do
worse as individuals in homogeneous contexts (comparing the individual-income results at
the 0 and 100 percent points) and better as individuals in heterogeneous groups. Like the
no-BP agents, the lower-delta agents are able take advantage of the reduced group costs
that their more responsible collaborators bring about. This further disproves our hypothesis
that the free-rider effect would be avoided under a lower outside-offer rate; see Section 6
for a discussion of why these experiments yield different results than the experiments that
formed the basis of our hypothesis. Both subgroups also see an increase in both individual
and group task income as the percentage of more responsible agents increases and overall
group costs decline.
5.2. DSCP experiments
We next present the results of experiments using the discount-based social-commitment
policy or DSCP (Section 3.2). The incomes that we present are normalized by dividing
each agent’s income by the undiscounted value of the tasks that it was assigned. Because
tasks are assigned randomly under the DSCP, this normalization factor is independent of
the agent’s behavior and thus will not artificially inflate the incomes of less responsible
subgroups, as it would under the RSCP.
5.2.1. Determining the baseline utility-function parameters for the DSCP
As in the RSCP experiments (Section 5.1.1), we began by conducting experiments
to determine the baseline settings for δ—the parameter that agents use to compute FEI
(Section 4.1)—and for BPweight—the parameter that agents use to weight brownie points
(Section 4.5). We once again tested many different pairs of values for δ and BPweight to
find the combination that maximizes mean individual income for homogeneous groups;
Fig. 8 displays the results of some of these experiments.
The tests show that agents operating under the DSCP maximize individual income when
they use a δ value of 0.85 and no brownie points (BPweight = 0). This result supports the
hypothesis that agents operating in homogeneous groups do better when they do not weight
future income too heavily, but it contradicts the hypothesis that such agents also do better
with an intermediate amount of social consciousness (see the introduction to Section 5).
Brownie points do not appear to offer the same benefit to agents operating under the DSCP
as they do to agents operating under the RSCP, although they might still be useful to groups
that use the DSCP under different environmental conditions.
Another important difference between the optimal RSCP and DSCP parameters is
that the optimal δ value is higher under the DSCP, meaning that DSCP agents do better
when they default less often. Agents cannot afford to default as often under the DSCP
because there are three different possible losses from defaulting: (1) the group costs of
defaulting, (2) income lost from tasks that are not completed because no replacement agent
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Fig. 8. The impact of δ and BPweight on the normalized mean individual income of homogeneous groups of
agents under the DSCP. To make the distinctions between the curves clearer, we have focused on a portion of the
y-axis from [0.9 : 1.2].
is available, and (3) income lost to discounting. In the RSCP, only the first two losses apply,
allowing RSCP agents to default more often.
Unless otherwise stated, the settings of δ = 0.85 and BPweight = 0 were used
throughout the experiments in this section. Because the optimal homogeneous-group
results are obtained without brownie points, we did not conduct experiments involving
heterogeneity in social consciousness like the ones discussed in Section 5.1.4.
5.2.2. Behavior of the DSCP under different task densities
In the next set of DSCP experiments, we varied task density, which can be expressed
as the percentage of agents who are scheduled to perform a task in each time slot. We
maintained a constant percentage of discounted tasks as we increased task density. As in
the RSCP version of these experiments (Section 5.1.2), we tested the following hypotheses:
(1) agents will default less often as task density is increased, provided that the percentage
of tasks affected by the social-commitment policy is held constant; and (2) increasing task
density will lead to lower individual and group incomes. Fig. 9 shows the results, which
mirror the trends seen in the corresponding RSCP experiments.
As task density increases, the decreasing availability of replacements and the increasing
number of discounted tasks leads agents to estimate larger losses from defaulting, and
thus to default less often (Fig. 9, left). In addition, agents do worse as individuals as task
density increases, while their group task income first rises and then falls (Fig. 9, right);
the explanation of the RSCP task-density results (Section 5.1.2) and how they relate to our
hypotheses also applies here.
5.2.3. Behavior of the DSCP under different outside-offer rates
The next set of DSCP experiments varied the outside-offer rate, considering cases in
which the number of outside offers were 10, 20, 30, 50, and 75 percent of the total number
of tasks. As in the RSCP version of these experiments (Section 5.1.3), we tested two
hypotheses: (1) as the number of offers increases, the rate of defaulting will stay the same,
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Fig. 9. The impact of task density on the rate of defaulting (left) and on normalized individual and group incomes
(right) when using the DSCP.
Fig. 10. The impact of the outside-offer rate on the rate of defaulting (left) and on normalized individual and
group incomes (right) when using the DSCP.
and thus the absolute number of defaults will increase; and (2) as the number of offers
increases, mean individual income will increase, but group income will decrease. Fig. 10
displays the results.
As we saw under the RSCP, agents default at a reduced rate as the outside-offer rate
increases (Fig. 10, left), contradicting our first hypothesis, while the absolute number of
defaults does increase slightly. The decreasing availability of replacement agents again
plays a role (Table 3), but this factor is less significant than it was under the RSCP,
because the lower overall rates of defaulting mean that the supply of replacement agents
is exhausted less frequently. A more important factor involves the way in which an
agent’s tasks are discounted (see Section 3.2). An agent’s reputation score, and thus its
ISF discount factor, is affected by the number of times that it defaults, not by its rate of
defaulting. Thus, to avoid increased estimated losses in FEI as the number of outside offers
increases, an agent must default at a lower rate.
The income that individual agents receive (Fig. 10, right) is affected by three factors:
(1) group costs, which increase as replacements become more scarce; (2) income that
agents receive from outside offers, which increases as agents default on a larger number of
tasks; and (3) discounts on task income, which increase as agents default on more tasks;
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Table 3
Effect of outside-offer rate on the average per-
centage of outside offers for which no replace-
ment agent is available under the DSCP
Outside-offer rate Offers with no
replacement
10% 0.16%
20% 0.94%
30% 1.98%
50% 3.79%
75% 5.56%
Fig. 11. Outcomes of heterogeneous-group experiments in which agents use two different values of δ to weight
future income under the DSCP. The rate of defaulting (left) and the normalized individual and group incomes
(right) are shown for each subgroup as the percentage of agents placing a higher value on future income is
increased.
these increased discounts are nonlinear because of the sigmoidal shape of the ISF function
(Fig. 1, left). Across the range of offer rates, the extra offer income outweighs the other two
factors, and the mean individual income increases slightly. For group task income, income
from offers is not included, and the other two factors thus lead to lower group incomes.
Both the increase in mean individual income and the decrease in group task income confirm
our second hypothesis.
5.2.4. Heterogeneity in the weight given to FEI under the DSCP
In this set of experiments using the DSCP, we fixed environmental factors and
considered heterogeneous groups of agents who use different δ values to weight FEI.
We considered cases in which none, 1/12,4/12,6/12,8/12,11/12, and all of the agents
use the optimal homogeneous-group δ setting of 0.85 (the higher-delta agents), and the
rest use δ = 0.75 (the lower-delta agents). As in the RSCP version of these experiments
(Section 5.1.5), we hypothesized that the higher-delta agents would do better than the
lower-delta agents, avoiding the free-rider effect seen in our earlier work. Fig. 11 displays
the results.
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Agents who put a higher value on future expected income default less often than agents
who do not value future income as much (Fig. 11, left ), mirroring the corresponding RSCP
results. As the percentage of more responsible agents increases, both subgroups default
somewhat less often. The presence of a larger number of more responsible, higher-delta
agents leads to slightly lower group discounts (i.e., the GSF factor is larger). As a result,
the discounted tasks are worth more (making the current-income gains from outside offers
less substantial), and agents estimate larger FEI losses. These two factors make all agents
less likely to default.
Here again, the less responsible, lower-delta agents do worse as individuals in
homogeneous contexts (comparing the individual-income results at the 0 and 100 percent
points) and better as individuals in heterogeneous groups (Fig. 11, right). Like the lower-
delta agents in the RSCP version of these experiments, these lower-delta agents are able
to take advantage of the reduced group costs that their more responsible collaborators
bring about, providing another example of the free-rider effect and contradicting our
hypothesis; see Section 6 for a discussion of why these experiments yield different
results than the experiments that formed the basis of our hypothesis. The presence of an
increasing percentage of higher-delta agents also leads to lower group costs and better
group reputations, and thus to higher incomes for both subgroups.
6. Discussion
The two social-commitment policies provide different models for how agent societies
might constrain the decision-making of their members. One key difference between the
two policies involves the accuracy with which agents can estimate their future losses from
defaulting. Because the income of agents operating under the DSCP does not depend on
their ranking with respect to other agents, they are able to make more accurate estimates
of their future income. The RSCP, on the other hand, avoids the need for monetary
punishments and the concomitant issue of what should be done with the income that agents
lose to discounting. These differences are reflected in the results, as explained in more
detail below.
As two different environmental factors—task density (Sections 5.1.2 and 5.2.2) and
outside-offer rate (Sections 5.1.3 and 5.2.3)—are increased, agents operating under both
policies decrease their rates of defaulting. However, the above-mentioned differences in
predictive accuracy play a role in these results, as the DSCP agents, by reducing their
rates of defaulting more sharply, incur smaller drops in individual and group task income
than the RSCP agents. This supports our hypothesis that agents operating under the DSCP
would respond better to changes in the environment.
We also compared the individual and group task incomes that agents earned under each
policy, testing our hypothesis that DSCP agents would achieve better individual and group
outcomes than RSCP agents. Because the discounts imposed by the DSCP increase the
costs of defaulting, and because agents operating under this policy can estimate these costs
quite accurately, DSCP agents tend to default less often than RSCP agents, and thus they
achieve higher group task incomes. However, DSCP agents also tend to have lower mean
individual incomes because of the income lost to discounting. Thus, our hypothesis was
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only partially correct; DSCP agents tend to do better as a group, while RSCP agents tend
to have somewhat higher individual incomes.4
The accuracy of the future-income estimates under both social-commitment policies
could be improved if estimates of future income from outside offers and losses from group
costs were taken into account. To include future outside offers in their estimates, agents
would need to learn about this aspect of their environment. More generally, because the
optimal δ and BPweight values depend on factors like the outside-offer rate and task
density, agents would benefit greatly from an ability to adapt their rates of defaulting in
response to changing environmental conditions.
The impact of social consciousness in the form of brownie points seems mixed. For a
given environment, both brownie points and the weight given to FEI by δ affect the rate
at which agents default and thus the income that they receive. Under the RSCP, both δ
and brownie points are needed to optimize the individual income of homogeneous groups
operating in our baseline environment (Fig. 3). Under the DSCP, however, homogeneous
groups of agents can optimize individual income without using brownie points by choosing
a δ value of 0.85 (Fig. 8). However, the optimal choice of these parameters is highly
dependent on the environment, and there may be situations in which brownie points
could also be used to improve individual outcomes under the DSCP. In addition, brownie
points can often improve group outcomes without large sacrifices in individual gains (see
Section 5.1.4).
Both social-commitment policies are susceptible to the free-rider effect in contexts
in which different agents use different values of δ or BPweight (Sections 5.1.4, 5.1.5,
and 5.2.4). While we had seen this effect in earlier work that used high outside-offer rates,
preliminary experiments led us to hypothesize that it would be avoided under a moderate
offer rate [40]. However, these preliminary experiments were conducted using baseline
settings for δ and BPweight that were chosen to work well under the high offer rates.
When the offer rate was lowered, the optimal parameter settings shifted, and the settings
used by the more responsible agents happened to do better under these new conditions. In
the work reported in this paper, the parameter settings used by the more responsible agents
were optimized for use under the lower offer rate. By deviating only slightly from these
optimal homogeneous-group settings, the less responsible agents do better by defaulting
more, because their more responsible collaborators keep the group costs lower than they
would be if all agents used the non-optimal settings.
In all three examples of the free-rider effect in this work, the less responsible agents
do worse as individuals in homogeneous contexts (comparing the 0 and 100 percent
points in the right-hand graphs in Figs. 6, 7, and 11). This phenomenon is similar to
the prisoner’s dilemma from game theory [2], in which a strategy of defecting strictly
dominates a strategy of cooperating, even though each agent’s outcome is worse when
everyone defects than when everyone cooperates. In situations like ours in which agents
interact repeatedly, cooperating can become a stable strategy if each agent believes that
defecting will terminate the interaction, resulting in a long-term loss that outweighs the
4 As mentioned in Section 3.2, the portion of the discount that stems from the group’s reputation is not actually
a part of the social-commitment policy because it comes from outside the group. To fully compare the individual
incomes under the two policies, we would need to use a group discount factor under the RSCP as well.
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short-term gain from defecting [29,35]. The two social-commitment policies could in
theory be changed to exact such a punishment by removing agents from the group when
they default more than a certain amount on group-related tasks.
Although the results of our heterogeneous-group experiments resemble the prisoner’s
dilemma, it is important to note that the less responsible agents outperform their more
responsible collaborators by only small amounts. In addition, these small individual gains
are accompanied by significantly lower group outcomes. Thus, agent designers may
do well to pursue epsilon-equilibria [29]. For any epsilon greater than 0, an epsilon-
equilibrium is a profile of strategies with the property that no agent has an alternative
strategy that increases its payoff by more than epsilon. Applying this concept to our
experiments would suggest that agent designers should choose the δ and BPweight values
that lead to optimal outcomes in homogeneous contexts.
In addition, our heterogeneous-group results are largely a result of the fact that group
costs are divided equally among the agents, while added income from an outside offer goes
only to the defaulting agent. Given this imbalance, less responsible agents should always
do better in heterogeneous contexts in which the more responsible agents use the parameter
settings that are optimal for homogeneous groups. If group costs were not divided equally,
the heterogeneous-group results might well be different. In the extreme case, the entire
group cost could be borne by the defaulting agent; this would effectively prevent agents
from defaulting. While this policy would increase group income, it would also decrease
individual income significantly. Finding a balanced policy would require information about
outside offers that may not be available when the policy is designed.
7. Related work
The problem of intention reconciliation is relevant to Grosz et al.’s SharedPlans-based
architecture for collaborative agents [17] and to the systems that have been built using this
architecture. One system, called GigAgents, is designed to support joint human-computer
collaborations [17]. A second system, called WebTrader [18], was developed to support
the cooperative processes of buying and selling goods on the Web. WebTraders can sell
their enterprise’s goods to human or automated buyers, and they can buy items needed by
their enterprises. SPIRE is general enough to be able to model agents from these and other
domains in which intention reconciliation in collaborative contexts is needed.
Other researchers in multi-agent systems have examined similar decision-making
scenarios in their work. Kalenka and Jennings [23] propose several “socially responsible”
decision-making principles and examine their effects in the context of a warehouse-loading
scenario. Our work differs from theirs in three main ways: (1) their policies are domain-
dependent and not decision-theoretic; (2) they consider agents choosing whether to help
each other, not agents defaulting on their team commitments; and (3) they do not allow
agents to default on their commitments. Kalenka and Jennings find that giving agents a
degree of social consciousness tends to improve overall outcomes, but that it may cause
individual performance to suffer in some cases; these results are similar to our own (see
Sections 5.1.1, 5.1.4, and 5.2.1).
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Sen [36] proposes decision-making strategies that encourage cooperation among self-
interested agents, but his work focuses on interactions between pairs of individuals,
rather than those between an individual and a team, and, like Kalenka and Jennings, he
considers decisions about whether to cooperate in the first place, not decisions about
whether to default on existing commitments. Sen’s work demonstrates the benefits of
social consciousness, but he shows that less responsible agents may take advantage of their
more responsible counterparts in some scenarios, a phenomenon that we have also seen
(see Sections 5.1.4, 5.1.5, and 5.2.4). However, Sen’s results also demonstrate that more
responsible agents can do better in the long run by basing their decisions about whether to
cooperate with a particular agent on that agent’s past behavior.
Xuan and Lesser [44] present a negotiation framework that takes into account
uncertainty about whether agents will honor their commitments. Similar to Sen, they focus
on interactions between pairs of individual agents, and they also assume that the details of
a commitment can be modified in a way that is satisfactory for both agents, whereas our
work addresses situations in which this assumption fails to hold.
Hogg and Jennings [19] experiment with agents who make decisions based on a
weighted sum of their own utility functions and those of their fellow team members,
and they demonstrate the benefit of this type of social consciousness in certain resource-
bounded contexts. The brownie-points model provides an alternative method of incorpo-
rating social consciousness that does not require agents to estimate the utility functions
of their collaborators, and it is explicitly geared to the problem of intention reconcili-
ation. Like Hogg and Jennings, we find that agents who have an intermediate level of
social consciousness do better as individuals in at least some environments (see Sec-
tion 5.1.1). However, Hogg and Jennings find that agents with a moderate amount of
social consciousness also do better in the presence of purely selfish agents, while our
experiments combining agents who use brownie points with those who do not reveal
a small but statistically significant free-rider effect (see Section 5.1.4). Hogg and Jen-
nings also consider the use of meta-level reasoning to control how much social rea-
soning the agents perform based on information about the state of the environment,
as well as the use of learning to allow agents to improve their decision-making over
time.
The social-commitment policies that we have defined in our work differ from the “social
laws” used in other multi-agent planning work [38]. Social laws provide constraints on
agents that allow their actions to be coordinated; these laws constrain the ways agents do
actions so that their activities do not negatively interact. In contrast, social-commitment
policies concern rational choice and the ways in which a society can influence an
individual’s decision-making. As a result, social laws are by their nature domain-specific,
whereas social-commitment policies affect decision-making across domains and tasks.
Rosenschein and Zlotkin [31] have presented mechanisms similar to social-commitment
policies in the context of negotiation between agents.
Sandholm et al. [1,32–34] propose a mechanism built into contracts that allows agents
to renege on their commitments by paying a predetermined cost known as a decommitment
penalty. A decommitment penalty is another example of a social-commitment policy,
one that is based solely on a given instance of defaulting. While SPIRE experiments
could be run using this type of social-commitment policy, we have focused on longer-
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term policies that are based on an agent’s history of defaulting, and we have considered
the use of internal measures of social consciousness in conjunction with externally
imposed social-commitment policies. In addition, Sandholm et al. focus on contracts
involving two or three non-collaborative agents,5 while we study the problem of intention
reconciliation in the context of an ongoing collaboration of a large set of agents.
Sandholm et al. find that allowing agents to decommit improves outcomes, a conclusion
that matches our own results showing that agents do better when they are allowed to
default (by using a BPweight value less than 1; see Sections 5.1.1 and 5.2.1). Sandholm
et al. are able to derive algorithms for optimizing contracts involving two or three
agents [33], while SPIRE allows one to experimentally determine the optimal utility-
function parameters for large groups of agents operating in a given environment (see
Sections 5.1.1 and 5.2.1).
Teague and Sonenberg [43] compare decommitment penalties with a measure of social
consciousness that is based on brownie points but uses a slightly different set of formulas
than the ones defined by Glass and Grosz [13]. Unlike the scenarios that we have examined,
which focus on whether agents should maintain their team commitments in the face of
subsequent offers, Teague and Sonenberg consider situations in which agents receive two
rounds of offered tasks (some of which require collaboration) and must decide whether
to accept an offer in the first round, as well as whether to default in the second round
for the sake of a new, more valuable offer. In this type of scenario, they find that both
brownie points and decommitment penalties constrain defaulting, but that decommitment
penalties generally lead to lower group outcomes because they can discourage agents from
committing to collaborative tasks in the first round when they anticipate more valuable,
second-round tasks. The social-commitment policies that we have proposed could also lead
agents to reject initial task offers, but we have not focused on the type of scenario in which
this effect could emerge. Teague and Sonenberg also propose an alternative mechanism
in which agents maintain estimates of the reliability of other agents (an external parallel
to the internal brownie-point measure) and use these estimates when deciding whether to
collaborate.
There is a significant body of economics literature on rational choice and intention
reconciliation. Iannaccone [22] examines social policies that alter individual utility
functions to encourage group commitment. While these policies are similar in spirit
to social-commitment policies, they are aimed at group formation, not at conflicting
intentions. His approach is also completely penalty-based, and is not applicable to
agents that face multiple decision points over time. Holländer [20] studies incentives
for encouraging group commitment and cooperation under a more limited definition of
cooperation, in which an agent is required to incur a personal cost in order to cooperate.
His model considers “emotional” cooperation within this limited definition, but assumes a
rigid standard shared by all players, a requirement that we relax.
5 Sandholm et al. do consider scenarios involving many agents [1], but the contracts—and thus the de-
commitments—are still between two agents. When they consider contracts involving three agents [33], one of
the agents is the contractor, and the other two agents are contractees who do not work as a team.
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8. Conclusions
The SPIRE empirical framework has enabled us to simulate and study the process of
intention reconciliation in collaborative contexts, examining the impact of environmental
factors, social norms, and agent utility functions on individual and group outcomes in
both homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. In this paper, we presented the results of
experiments involving two different types of social norms. The choice of social norms
influenced the accuracy of agents’ responses to changing environmental factors, as well as
the effectiveness of social consciousness and other aspects of the agents’ utility functions.
Both sets of norms were shown to be susceptible to the free-rider effect, but the gains of
the less responsible agents were minimal. In fact, our results suggest that agent designers
can achieve epsilon-equilibria by choosing utility-function parameters that lead to optimal
outcomes in homogeneous contexts. We plan to investigate additional social-commitment
policies to determine if this agent-design principle holds more generally.
In other future work with SPIRE, we will experiment with policies in which group costs
are not divided equally. As discussed in Section 6, we suspect that giving a larger share of
these costs to the defaulting agent may allow agents who are more responsible to fare
better in heterogeneous contexts. In addition, we plan to explore situations in which agents
have more information about their collaborators (e.g., knowledge of how responsible they
tend to be), and how this information can influence the agents’ decisions about whether
to default. We also plan to explore the related possibility of agents modeling and adapting
to the behavior of other agents. Das et al. [10] have conducted preliminary investigations
in this area. They present an algorithm that allows a single agent to learn optimal policies
for when to default given a simple characterization of the policy space and the assumption
that no other agents are learning. They also investigate the behavior of this algorithm when
more than one agent may be learning.
The experiments that we have conducted with SPIRE have made a number of
simplifying assumptions, including the following: (1) all agents are initially available
at all times; (2) all agents have the ability to perform all task types; (3) each of the
tasks in the group activity can be performed by an individual agent; and (4) each task
can be performed in a single time slot. We plan to investigate scenarios that eliminate
these simplifications. SPIRE is already able to handle agents with differing availabilities
and capabilities, although some scheduling issues may still need to be addressed. More
substantial modifications to the current system will be needed to accommodate tasks that
require multiple agents or span multiple time slots.
We are also interested in further investigating the interaction of social-commitment
policies with the social consciousness provided by brownie points. In our experiments
using the DSCP, brownie points were not needed to maximize outcomes. We suspect that
this result may stem from the more accurate estimates of future income that are possible
under the DSCP, but more experiments are needed to confirm this intuition. Regardless of
what these experiments reveal, brownie points will still be useful to agents who are unable
to make accurate FEI estimates, as well as in agent societies that track the reliability of
other agents, because the impact of defaulting in such contexts will extend beyond the
current collaboration.
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Because intention reconciliation in realistic multi-agent contexts is an extremely
complex problem, a system like SPIRE is essential for obtaining the insights needed to
design collaboration-capable agents [17]. Such agents will function not merely as tools but
as problem-solving partners, working as members of heterogeneous teams of people and
computer-based agents in our increasingly interconnected computing environments.
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